Proposal to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Unlike an article that requires permission or copyright waivers, this Senate Proposal is an entirely public document with no publication restrictions.

2009 – Timing to be determined

The Honorable John F. Kerry
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

                                Re:  Proposal to Establish Public Talks

Dear Senators Kerry and Lugar:

The Institute for Public Dialogue has designed an international communication process, “Public Talks.”  It is a negotiating alternative that could be considered after all other conventional talks have run their course.

Resulting from a series of rules and terms, Public Talks will create a level communications platform between two adversaries. It offers no ideological advantage to either side of a conflict. 

The central communications instrument of Public Talks is a series of 8-16 page, magazine size “Dialogue Documents” distributed online and through a small number of national and international print media.  Following a structure developed by the Senate committee, either side of a conflict could issue this formal challenge to negotiate in public without any guarantee of a response from that adversary.

Through its Dialogue Document, each side would have the ability to feature its interpretation of history.  This document would contain defined sections, including questions to one's adversary, negotiating positions, and other content inherent to international conflicts. Successive rounds of Public Talks would continue this highly structured exchange of views.

Every one or two weeks, one side would distribute a Dialogue Document that will likely reverberate throughout the media.  If accepted, this dialogue would unfold over two or three months and engage citizens on a new plateau of understanding the details of that conflict. 

Proposing a public negotiating process may cause immediate skepticism that focuses on motive.  This legitimate concern could be summarized:  What would motivate the more powerful of two adversaries to engage in a public negotiating process when it has already rejected private talks?

Motive, however, stands at the center of this proposal:

The first motive is why a group would initiate a Public Talks challenge. There is abundant evidence that many groups need to influence both American and world opinion to bring about change in their circumstances.  These many groups seek a dialogue with their adversaries even after all other avenues have been foreclosed.  They will be highly motivated to try this new process that brings their view of history before the world public.  Consider the many full-page ads that have run in the New York Times from groups seeking redress as just one common example among many of failed negotiations.

The second motive is why the more powerful entity would ever respond to this challenge.  To many observers, this is the strongest argument in favor of Public Talks.  If one envisions the less powerful entity distributing its version of history worldwide, followed up by interviews, political events and other media efforts, the more powerful entity has a difficult decision to make.  If it does not challenge the other side’s version of history, it runs a great risk:  The adversary’s version of history may gain ascendancy.  Citizens everywhere will ask: If this other version of history is not true, show us your side so we can weigh the two sides on an equal basis. Thus, a refusal to engage in a Public Talks challenge could begin an erosion of domestic and international support.

The third motive is why Americans will be motivated to support Public Talks.  Shortly after the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, a Pew Research poll found that 73 percent of Americans favored hearing both sides of issues, even if it meant hearing directly from enemies.  The American public, often times less ideological than its leaders, wants solutions. They see turmoil throughout the world and they see how this affects them in many direct and indirect ways.  Given the practical nature of the American public, their expected reaction to Public Talks will be:  “Let’s try it.  Let’s see if it works.” 

In today’s communications maelstrom, where erroneous facts and opinions merge with official pronouncements, the Dialogue Document provides an authoritative reference point for all parties.

Senate hearings are necessary to address a series of related issues, including when Public Talks should and should not be used.  Another key decision concerns the organization chosen to develop and oversee the parameters that will treat two sides of a conflict on an equal basis.  Competing issues of legitimacy and function provide arguments for and against the State Department, Congressional committees, the United Nations, the European Union, various established NGOs, and other forums. 

Attendant publicity surrounding the construction of Public Talks will develop over several months and be closely scrutinized.  These collateral events will ultimately involve many world capitals and will create public understanding of, and expectations for, this new form of international dialogue.  The organization tasked to develop the structure for Public Talks would seek widespread acceptance of this new communications platform that treats two adversaries equally.  Thus, many parties would need to be part of this development process.

Citizens everywhere will come to understand the details of conflicts between societies as never before.  As citizens and journalists worldwide see that Public Talks encourages a clash of views that allows a greater public understanding of historical truth, rejecting this challenge will become increasingly difficult.
Recognize that advocates of Public Talks do not seek termination of secret talks, but rather that leaders should encourage Public Talks when all other negotiations have stalled.  Full disclosure requires this Institute to define the larger plan to introduce Public Talks.

International stature and financial resources are the necessary predicates for the establishment of Public Talks.  The first phase of this initiative will focus on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. If this U.S. initiative is ultimately rejected, our focus will turn to Europe, where a series of proposals will be presented, beginning with the European Union, and will continue nation-by-nation until Public Talks is established.  Our web site defines the terms of these proposals:  “There are no costs associated with the transfer of all information, content and copyrights on Public Talks to any nation or organization that receives one of our formal proposals.”

Immediately following this cover letter is a document in three parts.  Following that is a second set of formal comments on Public Talks from both individuals and organizations.  Your time in reviewing this material is appreciated, and we look forward to receiving your response.

Sincerely,


John Connolly
Executive Director


One: Exposition

Public Talks will not replace private or back-channel negotiations, nor will it work in all situations.  It will be most effective in two-party negotiations, yet it is flexible enough for multilateral talks.  Once this level playing field is established as a formal negotiating alternative, the soft power of both U.S. diplomacy and world opinion will rise. 

Citizens worldwide will arrive at judgments about Public Talks in a markedly different way than traditional negotiations.  Presently, the public forms a judgment based on results reported in the media.  With Public Talks, citizens will arrive at judgments based on the facts and history presented by the two sides. A judgment, perhaps unfavorable, might be rendered upon those who refuse to engage in this dialogue. 

Consider the many examples of stalled or failed negotiations: Russia-Georgia, Iran-U.S./European allies, Israeli-Palestinian, India-Pakistan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Serbian-Kosovar/Albania, Turkey-Kurds, Spain-Basque Separatists and the Russia-U.S. suspended nuclear pact.  

The act of listing possible examples of where Public Talks can be applied will generate immediate concerns.  Will the U.S. be compelled to engage in unwanted negotiations with Iran?  What about Israel with the Palestinians?  Or other allies with their despised adversaries?  Yet Senate and House hearings can shape conditions under which this process unfolds.  They will certainly ensure that egregious use of this process by such organizations as Al Qaeda will not take place.
 
While some will view Public Talks through the prism of whatever single issue is of greatest personal concern, U.S. leaders need to take a long-term view of this process first and foremost within the context of American interests. Public Talks is a universal conflict resolution process that will focus world attention in a way that will tend to cause adversaries to want to be seen as reasonable.  As Public Talks unfolds, this phenomenon will tend to cause adversaries to take incremental steps towards concessions to each other positions. 

Even in situations where no response in kind is expected, such as the crises in Darfur and Burma, Public Talks could be an effective tool to bring about consensus for sanctions against the recalcitrant party.  It would be more powerful way because the public within many other nations will see the same arguments and historical narrative – at the same moment in time. 

This format may tempt some parties to obfuscate, manipulate and outright lie.  If so, their credibility would be damaged by a more forthright adversary. This direct clash of opinions exposes ideas to competitive examinations, so that only the more credible arguments would emerge as the basis for compromise.

Public Talks depends less on personal trust between leaders than private talks. At the culmination of the process, the final signed agreement delivered into the hands of citizens on both sides will increase confidence that the terms will not be reinterpreted in divergent ways.

U.S. policy on trade has consistently called for transparency and a level playing field for all commercial transactions.  On a philosophical level, Public Talks seeks to apply these same principles to foreign policy in a manner that is in alignment with the needs and norms of the 21st century. 


Two: Objections

(These and other anticipated objections are addressed in considerably more detail on our Web site)

Public Talks conflict with the secrecy that advocates of realpolitik insist on. 

Secret talks will always have a role, but Public Talks presents an alternative beyond failed negotiations. Leaders have frequently reinterpreted agreements in order to sell them to their constituencies, thereby sowing the seeds of a future conflict.  Many traditional negotiations including Versailles, Potsdam, and Yalta, led to agreements that participants later reinterpreted in vastly different ways, causing the agreement to be disavowed.  The failure of contemporary secret talks in Madrid, Dayton and Oslo points towards the need for an alternative negotiating model.  Moreover, some political leaders will sweep this secrecy objection aside with simple logic:  Public Talks only becomes an option after all secret talks have collapsed. It provides the U.S. with an additional tool, often at times of crisis, when existing procedures have failed.

Encouraging public opinion to dictate U.S. foreign policy is a bad idea. This claim envisions leaders abdicating leadership.  Public Talks will not compel leaders to act as the public wishes and there will undoubtedly be times when a U.S. leader explains that he or she will go against the grain as a matter of principle or policy.  Advancing historical truth behind both sides of a given conflict will not force resolution, but it will inject a small measure of balance in what is often an overwhelming public relations victory of the strong over the weak.

Typically, the U.S. will primarily be involved in Public Talks as a witness to a dialogue between other nations and societies.  When the U.S. chooses to engage in Public Talks, leaders will be able to explain their positions clearly and with detailed documentation.

Isn’t this just one more form of propaganda?  When and where have we seen propaganda in the form of a level playing field between two adversaries?  The strong and the weak will have the same platform to put forth their views on an equal basis.  A rational analysis of Public Talks will conclude that it is very much the opposite of propaganda.

This proposal is divorced from reality because governments don't care about advertisements or messages, only interests and power.  This ignores the growing importance of public opinion in the calculus of political leaders worldwide.  The rise of democracy and the increased access to information is advancing this phenomenon.  There are many manifestations of this from the White House's desire to "get in front" of a political issue, to the government stage-managing media events for its leaders, to diminishing public support leading to electoral defeat.

Aren’t Dialogue Documents just like common white papers?  No.  On a visceral level, all will perceive this process as a direct challenge.  This new media constitutes unfiltered news directly from principals in a conflict.  Dialogue Documents would be full color, multifaceted messages that would feature content unlike any we have seen before. The multiple sections of this new media would be different for various rounds of this process. 
 
This process will be designed to allow leaders to make their case in a powerful and dramatic way using modern visual tools combined with rhetoric shaped by the people most affected by that crisis.

The public will not be interested in a Dialogue Document when they have access to enormous quantities of information from many media outlets.  Predicting what interests the public is not a simple matter.  Recognizing the life and death nature of these communiqués, people everywhere may find Public Talks enormously compelling. The Dialogue Document would be the centerpiece of a worldwide communication process that the public would be anticipating in advance of its availability.  Millions would see these competing historical narratives between adversaries and recognize that the world would be simultaneously focusing on that same conflict at the same time. 

Nations could censor Public Talks by simply preventing the distribution of a Dialogue Document.  Yes, in areas under their control. However, attempts to block this process internally may backfire, as the rest of the world would pay close attention to any banned information.  Suppressed documents such as Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago became more powerful because they were banned and thus endowed with heroic status.

Negotiations could not really take place through documents designed for the public.  Unlike private talks that often begin with small confidence-building agreements, Public Talks would most likely start with the large issues that fundamentally separate adversaries. The contrasting historical narratives surrounding such conflicts are easily understood and if agreement is reached, lesser issues could be negotiated in later stages or indeed privately.  Moreover, a formal web site could feature relevant details.


Three: Conclusion

With the establishment of Public Talks, prime ministers, presidents, secretaries of state and foreign secretaries will see both their own citizens and people around the world becoming very much engaged in this step-by-step peace process.  Successive rounds of Public Talks will focus world attention on the necessary compromises for two sides to reach agreement. 

Calls from world leaders, editorial boards and media voices will add political and personal pressure on the negotiating parties to take incremental steps towards the other side.   Unlike the brief clichés that often serve to summarize each side’s positions today, the contrasting historical narratives of Public Talks will lead to a much wider understanding of the importance of justice in ensuring that an agreement be sustained on a long term basis.

Amidst the “battle of ideas” taking shape today, U.S. support for Public Talks will show the world community that Americans are interested in not just the symptoms of international conflicts, but also in underlying causes. An America that does not fear open discussion will more likely see its principles embraced around the world.
Once Public Talks enters our national discourse, polls will begin to ask a question that will be repeated in countries around the world.  It is a simple question that will shake dictators to their core, embolden advocates of democracy worldwide and present American leaders with a stark choice:  Will you support Public Talks after private talks fail?